A year ago, the prospect of a US-Iranian nuclear settlement seemed very distant. Now, top negotiators from Iran, the US and other major powers are convening in Geneva, and may be on the verge of concluding a deal this week over Iran’s nuclear programme. All signs point to a seriousness of purpose and a determination to get to an agreement. While the differences dividing Iran and the US are significant, the more difficult negotiations may well be the one each side faces at home.
Most major international negotiations are, as Robert Putnam, the Harvard political scientist, put it, a two-level game; one set of negotiations take place at the table between the parties and another set back home among different domestic constituencies. The Iran nuclear negotiations are no different, and their success will depend as much on how domestic forces align within the US and Iran as on the direct talks between them.
One reason for optimism in Geneva is that Hassan Rouhani, the new Iranian president, seems serious about striking a deal. So far, he appears to have the backing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader. But President Rouhani and his team are clearly operating on a very short leash. They need to secure quick relief from sanctions while minimising any constraint on Iran’s nuclear programme. Failure to deliver on either could strengthen domestic hardliners and torpedo further negotiations.
President Obama contends with similar domestic constraints – but ones that are exactly the reverse of Mr Rouhani’s. Big, bipartisan majorities in Congress remain deeply sceptical of Tehran’s motivations. Rather than relaxing sanctions, congressional leaders favour tightening them still further. While Tehran is seeking to minimise restrictions on its nuclear programme, many in Congress have maximalist demands, insisting that all major nuclear activities inside Iran, including enrichment of any kind, are not only ended but banned forever.
The challenge for Presidents Obama and Rouhani is to find a way to an agreement that takes account of – and ultimately overcomes – these opposing domestic forces. Time will be of the essence. Tehran’s hardliners are eager to demonstrate that accommodation will not work, while Congress is ready to impose new sanctions. Even if ultimately feasible, a comprehensive nuclear deal will take many months to negotiate.
Therefore, rather than seeking to achieve a full-on deal, the most immediate objective of the talks this week should be to achieve an interim agreement that will make a comprehensive one more likely in the future. For example, Iran might agree to halt further enrichment for, say, six months and turn more of its most enriched nuclear material into fuel for its research reactor. In return, Washington could unfreeze some of Iran’s overseas assets. Tehran would, of course, have to agree to more frequent and intrusive international inspections to verify that the enrichment freeze remained in place.
Such a short-term deal could provide the time necessary to get to a more comprehensive agreement. It may also give both sides some room with their domestic audiences. President Rouhani could trumpet the unfreezing of some of Iran’s capital while emphasising that the freeze on enrichment can always be undone. President Obama could point to the freeze as stopping the Iranian programme in place, while underscoring that none of the sanctions had been lifted.
Then again, none of these arguments may assuage those in Iran who want an absolute relief from all sanctions or those in the US (and Israel) who insist on a complete end to the Iranian nuclear programme. To them, an interim deal is only the first step towards an inevitably bad deal.
Yet, even if such sentiment against an interim deal is likely to exist, it is unclear whether these arguments would prevail. In Tehran, the supreme leader has indicated his support for negotiations and he might well give President Rouhani additional leeway to get to an agreement that lifted sanctions.
In Washington, Congress might seek to strengthen sanctions, but such a move will probably meet strong and vocal resistance not only from the Obama administration but also from European allies. Those latter concerns cannot be so easily dismissed. There is no doubt that punitive sanctions have forced Tehran’s hand and brought Iran to the table. While Congress led the charge for ever more stringent sanctions, their ultimate success depended on the US government bringing the Europeans and the rest of the world on board to ensure an airtight regime.
There is a similar need for multilateralism on any relaxing of sanctions. Europe has a major voice on whether and when to unwind key sanctions, and if Europeans believe Congress or the US is acting unreasonably in opposing a negotiated way forward, their willingness to keep sanctions in place will inevitably wane.
None of the optimism should obscure the complexity of this week’s negotiations. While all eyes will be on the table in Geneva, much of the real bargaining will take place in Tehran, Washington, Jerusalem and across the Atlantic.
Most major international negotiations are, as Robert Putnam, the Harvard political scientist, put it, a two-level game; one set of negotiations take place at the table between the parties and another set back home among different domestic constituencies. The Iran nuclear negotiations are no different, and their success will depend as much on how domestic forces align within the US and Iran as on the direct talks between them.
One reason for optimism in Geneva is that Hassan Rouhani, the new Iranian president, seems serious about striking a deal. So far, he appears to have the backing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader. But President Rouhani and his team are clearly operating on a very short leash. They need to secure quick relief from sanctions while minimising any constraint on Iran’s nuclear programme. Failure to deliver on either could strengthen domestic hardliners and torpedo further negotiations.
President Obama contends with similar domestic constraints – but ones that are exactly the reverse of Mr Rouhani’s. Big, bipartisan majorities in Congress remain deeply sceptical of Tehran’s motivations. Rather than relaxing sanctions, congressional leaders favour tightening them still further. While Tehran is seeking to minimise restrictions on its nuclear programme, many in Congress have maximalist demands, insisting that all major nuclear activities inside Iran, including enrichment of any kind, are not only ended but banned forever.
The challenge for Presidents Obama and Rouhani is to find a way to an agreement that takes account of – and ultimately overcomes – these opposing domestic forces. Time will be of the essence. Tehran’s hardliners are eager to demonstrate that accommodation will not work, while Congress is ready to impose new sanctions. Even if ultimately feasible, a comprehensive nuclear deal will take many months to negotiate.
Therefore, rather than seeking to achieve a full-on deal, the most immediate objective of the talks this week should be to achieve an interim agreement that will make a comprehensive one more likely in the future. For example, Iran might agree to halt further enrichment for, say, six months and turn more of its most enriched nuclear material into fuel for its research reactor. In return, Washington could unfreeze some of Iran’s overseas assets. Tehran would, of course, have to agree to more frequent and intrusive international inspections to verify that the enrichment freeze remained in place.
Such a short-term deal could provide the time necessary to get to a more comprehensive agreement. It may also give both sides some room with their domestic audiences. President Rouhani could trumpet the unfreezing of some of Iran’s capital while emphasising that the freeze on enrichment can always be undone. President Obama could point to the freeze as stopping the Iranian programme in place, while underscoring that none of the sanctions had been lifted.
Then again, none of these arguments may assuage those in Iran who want an absolute relief from all sanctions or those in the US (and Israel) who insist on a complete end to the Iranian nuclear programme. To them, an interim deal is only the first step towards an inevitably bad deal.
Yet, even if such sentiment against an interim deal is likely to exist, it is unclear whether these arguments would prevail. In Tehran, the supreme leader has indicated his support for negotiations and he might well give President Rouhani additional leeway to get to an agreement that lifted sanctions.
In Washington, Congress might seek to strengthen sanctions, but such a move will probably meet strong and vocal resistance not only from the Obama administration but also from European allies. Those latter concerns cannot be so easily dismissed. There is no doubt that punitive sanctions have forced Tehran’s hand and brought Iran to the table. While Congress led the charge for ever more stringent sanctions, their ultimate success depended on the US government bringing the Europeans and the rest of the world on board to ensure an airtight regime.
There is a similar need for multilateralism on any relaxing of sanctions. Europe has a major voice on whether and when to unwind key sanctions, and if Europeans believe Congress or the US is acting unreasonably in opposing a negotiated way forward, their willingness to keep sanctions in place will inevitably wane.
None of the optimism should obscure the complexity of this week’s negotiations. While all eyes will be on the table in Geneva, much of the real bargaining will take place in Tehran, Washington, Jerusalem and across the Atlantic.
No comments:
Post a Comment